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Schizophrenia is a severe mental disorder that is highly characterized by social cognitive
impairments. Most studies investigating these impairments focus on one specific
social domain such as emotion recognition. However, in daily life, processing complex
social situations relies on the combination of several social cognitive and affective
processes simultaneously rather than one process alone. A modified version of the
economically based Ultimatum Game was used to measure the interplay between
fairness, intentionality, and emotion considerations during social decision-making. In
this task, participants accept or reject fair and unfair monetary offers proposed
intentionally or unintentionally by either angry, happy, neutral, or sad proposers.
Behavioral data was collected from a group of schizophrenia patients (N = 35) and
a group of healthy individuals (N = 30). Like healthy participants, schizophrenia patients
differentiated between fair and unfair offers by rejecting unfair offers more compared
to fair offers. However, overall patients did reject more fair offers, indicating that their
construct of fairness operates within different margins. In both groups, intentional
unfair offers were rejected more compared to unintentional ones, indicating a normal
integration of intentionality considerations in schizophrenia. Importantly, healthy subjects
also differentiated between proposers’ emotion when rejecting unfair offers (more
rejections from proposers depicting angry faces compared to proposers depicting,
happy, neutral, or sad faces). Schizophrenia patients’ decision behavior on the other
hand, was not affected by the proposers’ emotions. The current study thus shows
that schizophrenia patients have specific problems with processing and integrating
emotional information. Importantly, the finding that patients display normal fairness
and intentionality considerations emphasizes preservation of central social cognitive
processes in schizophrenia.
Keywords: schizophrenia, social decision-making, fairness, intentionality, emotions, emotion processing,
Ultimatum Game
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Introduction
The last two decennia research in schizophrenia has shifted its
focus intensively from positive (e.g., hallucinations, delusions)
and negative symptoms (e.g., ﬂattened aﬀect, anhedonia; see
Andreasen et al., 1994) to social cognitive deﬁcits. An important
reason for this shift of interest relates to ﬁndings indicating that
these social cognitive deﬁcits are highly predictive for patients’
functional outcomes (Brekke et al., 2005). However, most
studies investigating social cognitive processes in populations
suﬀering from schizophrenia, rely on basic, relatively quick,
and automated cognitive processes as measured in, for example,
emotion-recognition tasks. Results on such tasks suggest that
schizophrenia patients experience problems in the perception of
emotional material, however, the speciﬁcity, extent, and nature
of the deﬁcits are unclear (Edwards et al., 2002). Yet, in order to
cope with diﬀerent social situations higher-order social cognitive
processes such as fairness or intentionality considerations are
also essential skills. These higher-order social cognitive processes
are often very complex as they rely on combinations of diﬀerent
(social) cognitive and aﬀective abilities (see Pinkham, 2014 for a
review on the core social cognitive domains in schizophrenia).
For instance, when someone wants to buy something, one
addresses his or her social knowledge about the context and
environment where he or she is in (e.g., buying a souvenir at
an exotic holiday spot or buying food at your local market), but
also considers the other person’s personal inferences (Theory of
Mind; e.g., is someone selling for personal proﬁt or for charity
purposes), and uses basic emotion-recognition processes (e.g., is
the person you are buying from happy or angry). Together with
someone’s attitude and personality traits, these social cognitive
processes contribute to one’s judgments and decisions in many
daily life situations, and importantly, also contribute to others’
perception of yourself.
During such complex social interactions, requiring reciprocity
an trust (Wischniewski and Brüne, 2011), and emotion regulation
processes (van der Meer et al., 2009), schizophrenia patients
tend to respond diﬀerently in comparison to healthy persons.
For instance, while testing the appreciation of moral standards,
older studies showed that schizophrenia patients less often
choose humanitarian responses to moral problems, and instead
more often choose authoritarian and self-protective options
(Johnson, 1960), or even adjust their moral decisions according
to the concepts of power, status, and possessions, rather than
equality and reciprocity (Benson, 1980). Unfortunately, this line
of research might have contributed to the stigmatization of
schizophrenia patients as being immoral beings in a way that
during the recent past studies about social norms and moral
values in schizophrenia have been disregarded (Wischniewski
and Brüne, 2011). Yet, to our knowledge, only one study so
far by Wischniewski and Brüne (2011) addressed the possibility
that deviating social norms and standards in schizophrenia
might also relate to these patients’ higher prevalence of being
victimized (Hodgins et al., 2009), treated unfairly, or being
bullied (Trotta et al., 2013). All factors known for their negative
interferences with these patients’ functional outcomes (Hodgins
et al., 2009).
Recently, higher-order moral judgments in humans have often
been investigated by using economic games like the Ultimatum
Game (UG) showing that moral judgment is universal and deeply
rooted in human nature. During the UG, two players split a
certain amount of money. One player plays the role of the
proposer, the other player acts as the responder. The proposer
decides how the money is split while the responder either accepts
or rejects the proposed oﬀer. When the responder accepts the
oﬀer, the amount of money is divided accordingly. However, if the
responder disagrees with the proposed split and rejects the oﬀer,
neither player receives anything. Although the most proﬁtable
strategy from an economical perspective would be to accept even
the smallest oﬀers, studies show that healthy individuals tend to
use diﬀerent strategies based on fairness and other emotional
aspects, rather than rational inferences. Therefore, unfair oﬀers
(30% or less from the total amount) are more likely rejected in
comparison to fair splits (50%; Nowak et al., 2000).
In schizophrenia, the impairments of certain higher-
order social cognitive abilities such as social norms and
values (Wischniewski and Brüne, 2011) might be related to
these patients’ known cognitive (e.g., executive functioning;
Nuechterlein et al., 2012) and social cognitive (e.g., emotion
processing; Green et al., 2012) dysfunctions. Yet, across several
UG studies schizophrenia patients depicted an inconsistent
decision pattern. For instance, Agay et al. (2008) was the ﬁrst to
report that schizophrenia patients, when acting as responders,
showed no diﬀerence in rejection rates compared to healthy
controls. However, Wischniewski and Brüne (2011) showed
that schizophrenia patients were likely to accept more unfair
oﬀers when compared to healthy individuals. The latter ﬁnding
is in line with a study reporting that unfair oﬀers are also more
likely to be accepted by individuals with high schizotypal traits
(van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2011). Yet, another study reported that
schizophrenia patients accepted more unfair oﬀers and rejected
more fair oﬀers in comparison with healthy controls (Csukly
et al., 2011). Above that, they also found that these patients’
acceptance/rejection behavior was not aﬀected by the emotion
of the proposer, whilst healthy controls accepted more oﬀers
proposed by happy individuals than angry individuals (depicted
on a photograph).
While these studies mainly focus on fairness considerations
and the reactions toward the direct outcomes of the proposed
oﬀers, they do not allow to measure intentional variations of the
proposed oﬀers. Yet, as stated before, social decision-making is
a complex process requiring the integration of several cognitive
and social cognitive abilities working together toward a ﬁnal
decision. Therefore, a modiﬁed version of the UG has previously
been developed in a way that each proposed oﬀer is contrasted
against another possible alternative oﬀer that has not been chosen
(Falk et al., 2003; Gürog˘lu et al., 2010). Using this method, the
responder can weigh the proposer’s oﬀer against an alternative
oﬀer that is either more fair, more unfair, or the same (no
alternative). Studies that used this modiﬁed version of the UG
showed that healthy individuals reject unfair oﬀers more often
in the presence of an unselected fair alternative compared to
situations where the proposer could only choose between two
equally unfair oﬀers (no-alternative; Falk et al., 2003; Gürog˘lu
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et al., 2009, 2010; Radke and de Bruijn, 2012; Radke et al.,
2012). This emphasizes that fairness considerations are not only
depending on the direct proﬁtable outcomes, but also depend
on contextual factors and the intentions they signal (Falk et al.,
2008).
In schizophrenia, this method was recently also used in a
crossover study directly comparing smoking and non-smoking
patients after administration of a placebo, 1 or 2 mg of
nicotine (Quisenaerts et al., 2013). Results showed that smoking
patients’ decisions were aﬀected by the unchosen alternative
oﬀer (context) in the expected pattern described above. Non-
smoking patients’ on the other hand did not dissociate between
the diﬀerent alternatives. They did show, however, a normalized
eﬀect of context after administration of 1 mg of nicotine.
The authors argued that this normalizing eﬀect in non-
smokers might be related to the inverted U shape nature
of the cognitive enhancing properties of nicotine. However,
intentionality can also be deﬁned by the emotion one expresses.
This has been demonstrated by Schreiner et al. (2010) and
Csukly et al. (2011) who showed that healthy individuals
accepted more oﬀers from happy proposers than from angry
proposers.
Crucially, in daily life, these various determinants of social
decision-making are combined and have to be processed
simultaneously, thus complicating the task tremendously.
A recent study aimed at targeting this complexity by combining
fairness, contextual, and aﬀective variables into a modiﬁed UG
(Radke et al., 2013). The results of this study showed that both
healthy controls’ and depressed patients’ rejection rates were
highest when the unfair treatment was clearly intentional, so
when paired with a fair alternative and when oﬀered with an
angry expression. Overall rejection rates were, however, larger in
the patient group.
Because of the contradictory ﬁndings on social decision-
making in schizophrenia research so far, it is important to
investigate the involved processes as they occur simultaneously
and need to be integrated for adequate decision-making.
Following Radke et al. (2013), we therefore used a modiﬁed
version of the UG that allowed us to disentangle fairness,
intentionality, and emotion considerations. Based on the ﬁndings
of Quisenaerts et al. (2013), we ﬁrst hypothesize that like healthy
individuals, schizophrenia patients’ decisions will be aﬀected
by intentionality, i.e., the unchosen alternative oﬀer. Second,
as reported in the study of Csukly et al. (2011), we expect
that schizophrenia patients’ decisions are less aﬀected by the
proposers’ emotions. Third, because of the mixed outcomes
regarding acceptance and rejections rates of fair and unfair oﬀers
in previous UG studies we also hypothesize that schizophrenia
patients will show aberrant behavior when considering fair versus
unfair oﬀers by either rejecting more fair oﬀers or accepting
more unfair oﬀers than healthy controls. Given the complexity
of the study design and the absence of any previous studies
investigating context eﬀects such as emotion and intentionality
during fairness considerations in schizophrenia patients, we
refrained from formulating speciﬁc hypotheses about modulatory
inﬂuences of these contexts on group diﬀerences in rejection
rates.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The patient group consisted of 37 schizophrenia patients (25
inpatients) recruited from three diﬀerent Belgian psychiatric
centers (PC Sint-Norbertus Duﬀel: N = 23; PC Sint-Amadeus
Mortsel: N = 11; PC Brother Alexians Boechout: N = 3)
diagnosed using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV Axis I disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 2002). Patients
with current depression or a recent history of substance use
disorder (6 months) were excluded. All patients were stable
on antipsychotic medication for at least 2 weeks. Fifteen
patients received monotherapy with an atypical antipsychotic,
one received conventional neuroleptic monotherapy and 21
patients were on polytherapy (14 patients were treated with a
combination of atypicals and 9 received a combination of an
atypical antipsychotic and a conventional neuroleptic). In order
to control for diﬀerences in medication, chlorpromazine
levels are calculated (cf., Kroken et al., 2009) based on
the patients’ medication proﬁles. Besides antipsychotic
medication, some patients were treated with mood stabilizers
(N = 8), antidepressants (N = 14), benzodiazepines (N = 7),
and/or anticholinergics (N = 4). Severity of the positive
and the negative symptoms were rated during a semi-
structured interview using the Scale for the Assessment
of Negative Symptoms and the Scale for the Assessment
of Positive Symptoms (SANS and SAPS; Andreasen, 1983,
1984).
The control group consisted of 30 healthy individuals that
were matched for age and gender with the patient group.
The study was approved according to the latest Declaration of
Helsinki by all the local ethical committees of the participating
centers and all participants gave their written informed
consent.
Since high rejection rates of fair oﬀers clearly indicate a lack of
understanding the task objective, participants who rejected 75%
or more fair oﬀers were excluded from analyses, which resulted
in the exclusion of two patients. This left us with a group of 35
schizophrenia patients and 30 healthy controls (see Table 1 for
group characteristics).
TABLE 1 | Clinical and sociodemographic data.
Controls Patients T X2 p
N = 30 N = 35
Age 29.6 (9.3) 31.2 (8.3) 0,736 0.464
Gender (m/f) 26/4 32/3 −0,613 0.540
Duration of illness
(years)
7.6 (7.0)
SAPS 14.3 (12.0)
SANS 33.6 (16.4)
CDS 0.7 (1.5)
Chlorpromazine
equivalent
556 (371)
SAPS, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms; SANS, Scale for the
Assessment of Negative Symptoms; CDS, Calgary Depression Scale. Values
shown are absolute or means with SD between parentheses.
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Material and Procedure
Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology
Software Tools Inc, 2012, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) that was
programmed with a modiﬁed version of the UG (Figure 1) in
which participants played the role of the responder (cf. Radke
et al., 2013). They were told to be playing against the saved data
of diﬀerent proposers who previously participated in this game.
On each of the 64 trials, a picture of a diﬀerent proposer with his
or her ﬁctive name was shown in the upper left part of the screen.
These pictures were derived from diﬀerent databases (Lundqvist
et al., 1998; Ebner et al., 2010).
Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross (1000 ms), followed by
a presentation of two available monetary distributions (1000 ms).
Then, the proposer’s selected oﬀer was surrounded by a red
rectangle (1000 ms). Subsequently, while the selection remained
visible, “yes” and “no” buttons were presented as depicted
in Figure 1. The participants had unlimited time to respond
by pressing one of the two assigned keys on a keyboard.
Participants’ response remained visible for 2000 ms before
the next trial started. The position of unfair oﬀers and the
proposer’s gender were counterbalanced. In contrast with the
participants’ belief, all choices were computer-generated and
randomly presented.
By pressing the “yes” or “no” key, participants either accepted
or rejected the proposer’s oﬀer. Acceptance resulted in an
outcome according to the proposed split while rejection resulted
in a complete loss for both. To assure the participants’ motivation,
they were informed that every trial could inﬂuence their ﬁnancial
outcome at the end of the task since several trials were randomly
chosen in order to compute their personal proﬁt. Moreover,
participants were also instructed about the inﬂuence of their
decisions on the proposers’ proﬁt that would be paid to them
FIGURE 1 | Display of the decision phase in the fair-alternative
condition with a neutral proposer. On the left, name and picture of the
proposer (here “Proposer”) and the name of the participant (here “You”) are
shown. Red and blue coins specify the two potential distributions. The
selected offer is encircled in red. The participant has to decide whether to
accept (“YES”) or reject (“NO”) the offer.
after all data of the responders had been collected. In fact, the
payoﬀ was set around 2.50 Euro, so that all participants received
an equal amount.
Design and Analyses
The task consisted of 64 trials. On 40 trials the unfair oﬀer (8:2)
was selected against (i) a hyperfair (2:8) alternative (8 trials, 2 per
emotion), (ii) a fair (5:5) alternative (16 trials, 4 per emotion), or
(iii) no alternative (8:2; 16 trials, 4 per emotion). On 16 trials a fair
oﬀer was selected against an unfair alternative (4 per emotion)
and eight trials consisted of hyperfair oﬀers against an unfair
alternative (2 per emotion). The trials including either a hyperfair
oﬀer or hyperfair alternative were used to induce more variance
in the set of oﬀers and to avoid suspicion from participants being
faced with only 5:5 and 8:2 splits on all trials. Therefore, these
trials will not be included during analyses (cf. Radke and de
Bruijn, 2012).
For analyzing the data, ﬁrst general rejection behavior was
analyzed to investigate the presence of a basic understanding
of the task and the concept of fairness. Speciﬁcally, rejection
rates to fair oﬀers with an unfair alternative and unfair oﬀers
with a fair alternative were subjected to a repeated measures
ANOVA with fairness (two levels: fair, unfair) and emotion (four
levels: angry, happy, neutral, sad) as within-subject factor and
group (two levels: schizophrenia patients, healthy controls) as a
between-subjects factor.
Second, reactions to unfair oﬀers with the same payoﬀ (8:2)
were analyzed against diﬀerent manipulations of the within-
subject factors context and emotion. The factor context refers
to the alternative oﬀer that had not been chosen while the
factor emotion pertains to the emotional expression of the
proposer. The rejection rates were subjected to a repeated
measures ANOVA with context (two levels: fair, no alternative)
and emotion (four levels: angry, happy, neutral, sad) as within-
subject factors and group (two levels: schizophrenia patients,
healthy controls) as between subjects-factor.
Separate analyses for possible eﬀects of medication on
schizophrenia patients’ rejection behavior alone were also
assessed including the chlorpromazine equivalent as a covariate.
Within-subject eﬀects of all analyses are reported with Huynh–
Feldt corrections in cases were the assumption of Sphericity is
violated.
Results
Rejection Behavior
The ANOVA repeated measures revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of fairness [F(1,63) = 144.92, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.70] with higher
rejection rates to unfair oﬀers (67%) compared to fair oﬀers
(5%). The main eﬀect of emotion was marginally signiﬁcant
[F(1,63) = 2.61, p = 0.057, η2 = 0.04], mainly due to a higher
rejection rate of oﬀers from angry proposers (38%) compared to
oﬀers from happy proposers (34%; p= 0.017). More importantly,
the interaction between fairness and group (Figure 2) was also
signiﬁcant [F(1,63) = 4.60, p = 0.036, η2 = 0.07]. Follow-up
analyses of this interaction showed a signiﬁcant group diﬀerence
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FIGURE 2 | Rejection rates of fair and unfair offers (collapsed over
emotions). Overall mean percentage and SE are displayed.
of the rejection rate to fair oﬀers [F(1,63) = 8.02, p = 0.006,
η2 = 0.11], indicating that patients rejected more fair oﬀers
(10%) compared to healthy controls (0.4%). Regarding the unfair
oﬀers, schizophrenia patients’ acceptance rate (40%) were higher
compared to healthy controls’ (27%), however, this diﬀerence was
only numerical [F(1,63) = 1.66, p = 0.203, η2 = 0.03]. All other
main eﬀects and interactions were not signiﬁcant [All Fs < 1.61,
all ps > 0.197, all η2 < 0.03].
After separate analyses for the patient group alone including
the chlorpromazine equivalent as a covariate, the main eﬀect
of fairness remained signiﬁcant [F(1,33) = 28.69, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.47].
Reactions to Unfairness
The results of the ANOVA depicted in Figure 3 showed a
main eﬀect of context [F(1,63) = 46.56, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43]
and emotion [F(3,189) = 3.81, p = 0.013, η2 = 0.06]. The
three-way interaction was marginally signiﬁcant [F(3,189) = 2.74,
p= 0.056, η2 = 0.04]. Separate group follow-up analyses revealed
a main eﬀect of context in both groups [controls: F(1,29) = 22.19,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43; patients: F(1,34) = 24.24, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.42] indicated that both healthy controls and schizophrenia
patients rejected more unfair oﬀers when the proposer had a fair
alternative (controls: 73%; patients: 60%) compared to rejections
of unfair oﬀers with no-alternative (controls: 36%; patients: 28%).
Importantly however, controls showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
emotion [F(3,87) = 2.98, p = 0.046, η2 = 0.09] that was not
apparent in the group of patients [F(3,102) = 2.13, p = 0.109,
η2 = 0.06]. Post hoc pairwise comparisons showed that healthy
controls rejected more unfair oﬀers of angry faces (59%) in
comparison to unfair oﬀers of happy faces (52%; p = 0.016)
and neutral faces (55%; p = 0.039). Unfair oﬀers of angry
faces were also numerically rejected more compared to unfair
oﬀers of sad faces (53%; p = 0.068). The remaining pairwise
comparisons between happy, neutral, and sad faces were not
signiﬁcant (all ps > 0.160). Interestingly, when analyzing both
groups separately, the patient group also showed a marginal
signiﬁcant two-way interaction between context and emotion
[F(3,102) = 2.42, p = 0.090, η2 = 0.07] that was not apparent in
the control group [F < 1]. Subsequent analyses of this interaction
per context revealed that schizophrenia patients showed an
eﬀect of emotion only when they were oﬀered an intentional
unfair split (fair alternative context) [F(3,102) = 3.83, p = 0.019,
η2 = 0.10], but not when they were oﬀered an unintentional
unfair split (no-alternative context) [F(3,102) < 1]. Follow-up
pairwise comparisons showed that during these intentional unfair
oﬀers, schizophrenia patients rejected more oﬀers from angry
(65%) compared to happy (55%; p= 0.021) and neutral proposers
(59%; p = 0.048), and also rejected more unfair oﬀers from sad
(63%) compared to happy proposers (p = 0.019). All other main
eﬀects or interactions of the primary ANOVAwere not signiﬁcant
[All Fs< 1.68, all ps > 0.199, all η2 < 0.03].
A closer look at Figure 3might imply that while schizophrenia
patients are aﬀected by the proposers’ emotions during unfair
oﬀers in the context of a fair alternative, healthy controls are
rather aﬀected by emotions during unfair oﬀers in the no-
alternative context. Therefore, subsequent analyses per context
were also executed. The interaction between emotion and
group was not signiﬁcant during the intentional unfair context
[F(3,189) = 1.46, p= 0.228, η2 = 0.02], but showed a trend during
the unintentional unfair context [F(3,189) = 2.36, p = 0.073,
η2 = 0.04]. Follow-up analyses of the latter interaction, suggested
that in contrast to schizophrenia patients [F(3,102) < 1], only
healthy controls [F(3,87) = 2.82, p = 0.056, η2 = 0.09] were
aﬀected by the proposers’ emotions during unintentional unfair
proposals. More speciﬁcally, oﬀers from angry proposers were
rejected more (43%) compared to oﬀers from happy (33%;
p = 0.016), sad (35%; p = 0.048), and neutral proposers (35%;
p = 0.059). This latter result is in line with the previous analyses
showing that only healthy controls are aﬀected by emotions, yet
particularly when the proposer had no-alternative.
After analyzing the patient group alone including the
chlorpromazine equivalents as a covariate, the main eﬀect of
context remained signiﬁcant [F(1,33) = 13.37, p = 0.001], while
there was still no eﬀect of emotion [F(3,99) = 1.28, p= 0.286].
Discussion
By using a modiﬁed version of the UG in combination with
emotional faces we aimed to deepen our understanding of
higher-order social decision-making processes involving fairness,
intentionality, and emotion considerations in schizophrenia
patients. Our primary ﬁnding showed that schizophrenia patients
and healthy controls were similarly aﬀected by the intentionality
behind unfair oﬀers as reﬂected by the context in which oﬀers
were proposed, i.e., more rejections of unfair oﬀers with a
fair alternative compared to unfair oﬀers with no-alternative.
Second, we found that unlike patients, healthy controls’ decisions
to unfair oﬀers were also aﬀected by the emotional state
of the proposers (i.e., more rejections of unfair oﬀers from
angry proposers compared to unfair oﬀers from happy or
neutral proposers). However, subsequent analyses indicated that
schizophrenia patients also might be aﬀected by the proposers’
emotions, yet particularly when they were oﬀered an intentional
unfair split (i.e., more rejection of intentional unfair oﬀers
from angry proposers compared to intentional unfair oﬀers
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FIGURE 3 | Rejection rates of unfair offers with regard to the facial emotion of the proposer and alternative offers. Overall mean percentage and SE of
rejections are displayed for schizophrenia patients and healthy individuals.
from happy proposers and neutral proposers, and also more
rejections of intentional unfair oﬀers from sad versus happy
proposers). Third, while both groups rejected unfair oﬀers more
often compared to fair oﬀers, schizophrenia patients speciﬁcally
rejected more fair oﬀers in comparison to healthy controls.
The latter ﬁnding is in accordance with our hypothesis
stating that schizophrenia patients will show aberrant behavior
when considering fair versus unfair oﬀers by either rejecting
more fair oﬀers or accepting more unfair oﬀers than healthy
controls. This ﬁnding is also in line with a previous study
of Csukly et al. (2011) who reported that, in comparison to
healthy controls, schizophrenia patients rejected more fair oﬀers.
Besides this, Agay et al. (2008) also reported that regardless the
amount of the oﬀer, schizophrenia patients generally rejected
more oﬀers. In contrast, however, Wischniewski and Brüne
(2011) did not ﬁnd increased rejections toward fair oﬀers in
schizophrenia patients. Yet, in line with Csukly et al. (2011),
they did report the reverse eﬀect where schizophrenia patients
accepted more unfair oﬀers, a ﬁnding that was not present in
the current data. Csukly et al. (2011) suggested that: “rather
than being rational maximizers, schizophrenia patients seem
to be ‘inconsistent maximizers,’ following a paradox strategy.”
A possible explanation for this inconsistent behavior was not
directly given by the authors, however, one might assume that
because of schizophrenia patients’ heightened state of social
anxiety (Green and Phillips, 2004) and tendency to suppress
emotions rather than reappraise them (van der Meer et al., 2009),
social avoidant behavior is reinforced (de la Asuncion et al., in
revision) resulting in more rejections of fair oﬀers. Alternatively,
disturbed reward processing or negative symptomatology such
as blunted aﬀect and anhedonia might underlie the increased
rejection rate of fair oﬀers. Disturbances in reward processing
have been demonstrated before in schizophrenia patients and
contribute to reduced goal-directed behavior or pleasure-seeking
behavior (Strauss et al., 2014) as currently reﬂected in increased
rejection rates of fair oﬀers.
The ﬁnding that schizophrenia patients, like healthy controls,
reject unfair oﬀers more often in cases where the proposer
had the ability to choose for a fair alternative (intentional
unfair) compared to cases were the proposer had no alternative
(unintentional unfair), are directly in line with our ﬁrst
hypothesis expecting both groups to be sensitive toward the
diﬀerent contexts. Correspondingly, Quisenaerts et al. (2013)
reported the same behavior in a group of smoking schizophrenia
patients. However, non-smoking schizophrenia patients only
showed this pattern after they were administered 1 mg of
nicotine. Although we did not register smoking behavior of our
participants, we may assume that more than 80% of our patients
were smokers (Keltner and Grant, 2006) resembling the smoking
group in Quisenaerts et al. (2013) more likely than the non-
smoking group. It might therefore be possible that in the current
study, patients beneﬁt from the cognitive enhancing properties
of nicotine (Newhouse et al., 2011). However, this is merely
speculative and must be studied more speciﬁcally. Another study
using the same paradigm while comparing a group of healthy
controls and individuals suﬀering from depression, also reported
more rejections of unfair oﬀers in the context of a fair alternative
compared to no alternative in both groups (Radke et al., 2013).
Furthermore, previous research in healthy controls found that
people responded in a pattern where acceptance rates declines
with higher degrees of unfairness (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;
Sanfey et al., 2003). This pattern was also found in schizophrenia
patients (Csukly et al., 2011; Wischniewski and Brüne, 2011)
and is in accordance with our ﬁnding of both patients and
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healthy controls rejecting intentional unfair oﬀers more likely
compared to unintentional unfair oﬀers. This shows that like
healthy individuals, schizophrenia patients adequately recognize
unfair intentions and have an intact sense of fairness in general.
Regarding the inﬂuence of the proposers’ emotional state
while making an oﬀer, we hypothesized that schizophrenia
patients would be less sensitive toward the emotion compared to
healthy controls. Our results were in line with this proposition
and showed that only healthy controls’ behavior was directly
inﬂuenced by the proposers’ emotions. Speciﬁcally, healthy
controls rejected unfair distributions more often when they
were oﬀered by an angry proposer compared to unfair oﬀers
proposed by a happy or a neutral proposer. This is also
partially in line with the results of Radke et al. (2013) who
reported more rejections of unfair oﬀers from proposers with
angry faces compared to happy and sad proposers in both
healthy controls and patients with depression. Rejection behavior
of schizophrenia patients, however, was not aﬀected by the
proposers’ emotions. A similar result was previously reported
by Csukly et al. (2014) using a traditional Ultimatum Game.
They found that healthy individuals alone accepted slightly
unfair oﬀers (40%) and fair oﬀers (50%) more likely when
the proposer was happy compared to angry proposers. In the
current study, controls were still aﬀected by the proposer’s
emotion while they only received an oﬀer of 20% from the
total amount. The reason why healthy controls are still likely
to accept these highly unfair oﬀers more from happy, neutral,
and sad proposers is related to the diﬀerent contexts, which
partially included unintentional unfair oﬀers (no alternative). i.e.,
since the proposer did not have a real choice when confronted
with two equally unfair oﬀers, controls have taken that into
account resulting in less rejections of the proposed oﬀer. More
importantly, however, is the question why schizophrenia patients
were not aﬀected by the proposers’ emotions. One explanation is
related to schizophrenia patients’ abnormal emotion-recognition
abilities (Edwards et al., 2002). Since these patients have
diﬃculties to distinguish diﬀerent emotions and are prone to
misinterpret ambiguous (de la Asuncion et al., in revision)
and neutral emotions (Pinkham et al., 2011), one might argue
that these patients do not diﬀerentiate well enough between
the diﬀerent emotions and consider them more alike. However,
Csukly et al. (2014) controlled for impaired emotion-recognition
abilities and did not ﬁnd an inﬂuence of these impairments on
the patients’ behavior. Moreover, the currently used task was
completely self-paced, providing the participants with ample
time to process all the information. A pressure for speed
can thus not explain possible integration problems. Therefore,
one can also assume that rather than abnormal emotion-
recognition abilities in schizophrenia, these patients deviate in
the processing of the depicted emotions during this complex
task.
This latter assumption is supported by some of the ﬁndings
during the subsequent analyses we performed. These results
showed that healthy controls’ reactions to emotions remained
the same during the two unfair contexts with generally more
rejections of unfair oﬀers from angry proposers compared
to happy, neutral, and sad proposers. Schizophrenia patients,
however, showed a marginal signiﬁcant interaction between
emotion and context, implying that these patients’ decisions
were only aﬀected by emotions when oﬀered an intentional
unfair oﬀer, but not during unintentional unfair oﬀers. First,
this indicates that like healthy controls, schizophrenia patients
do process the emotions of others during complex social
decision-making situations, yet, when focusing on the speciﬁc
rejection behaviors toward the diﬀerent emotions, some group
diﬀerences appear. Speciﬁcally, schizophrenia patients reject
more intentional unfair oﬀers from sad compared to happy
proposers, while both groups reject more (intentional) unfair
oﬀers from angry proposers compared to happy and neutral
proposers. Possible group diﬀerences in attribution style might
be responsible for these diﬀerent reaction patterns toward sad
proposers. While healthy controls, for instance, interpret the sad
emotion as a sign of compassion toward the participant because
of the negative situation (attribution of negative valence to the
situation), schizophrenia patients rather attribute this negative
emotion to the proposer because of their personalizing bias
(attribution of negative valence to the person; Langdon et al.,
2006). Alternatively, schizophrenia patients’ impaired Theory of
Mind or poor insight of others’ mental states (Brune, 2005),
might also be an explanation for their aberrant behavior toward
sad proposers. Second, the fact that schizophrenia patients
are only aﬀected by the proposers’ emotion during intentional
unfair trials, and not during unintentional unfair trials, suggest
that these patients process the emotions diﬀerently when the
oﬀer can be regarded as a genuine unfair choice from the
proposer toward the patient. This is in line with previous
ﬁndings showing that schizophrenia patients who are primed
with a negative aﬀective prime, express an exaggerated negative
inﬂuence on their social judgment (Hooker et al., 2011). Whether
the aﬀective prime in this study can be related to the negative
emotion or the intentional unfair oﬀer is unclear. However,
the fact that schizophrenia patients do not diﬀerentiate between
emotions when oﬀered an unintentional unfair split, suggest that
these patients ﬁrst process the intentionality of the oﬀer, and
depending on how negative the intentions are, further process
other contextual factors such as the proposers’ emotions. So
when an unfair oﬀer was unintended and the proposer had
no real choice, patients seem to feel less aﬀected by it and
disregard the proposers’ emotion. Yet, these ﬁnal interpretations
are mainly based on marginal signiﬁcant results. Therefore,
we must remain cautious about their validity, however, in the
light of future studies, they might have a signiﬁcant additional
value.
One of the shortcomings of this study is that the participants
were mostly males. Therefore, possible gender diﬀerences in
social decision-making cannot be addressed. However, since
the prevalence of schizophrenia is much higher in males than
in females (Aleman et al., 2003), the gender diﬀerences in
the current study represent a rather realistic reﬂection of
general patient populations. Also, all participants in the patient
group were on antipsychotic treatment, and we were thus
unable to rule out possible eﬀects of antipsychotic medication
on patients’ decision-making process. Yet, post hoc analyses
including patients’ individual chlorpromazine equivalents as a
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covariate factor, did not change the previously described eﬀects
in this group.
Taken together, it is clear that schizophrenia patients
adequately diﬀerentiate between fair and unfair oﬀers, suggesting
that these patients have a basic understanding of moral
reasoning. However, when compared directly with healthy
individuals, possible disturbances in schizophrenia patients’
reward processing inﬂuence their margins of fairness judgments
in a way that is disadvantageous for themselves (i.e., higher
rejection rates of fair oﬀers). In addition, schizophrenia patients’
ability to diﬀerentiate between intentional and unintentional
oﬀers is still intact. Both outcomes imply that these social
cognitive capacities that play a central role in social decision-
making are preserved in schizophrenia. On the other hand, these
patients do seem to have problems with processing the emotional
information of others during this complex social decision-
making task, and even seem to process information diﬀerently
in diﬀerent contexts. This shows that schizophrenia patients
have problems with correctly combining and integrating diﬀerent
pieces of information during higher order cognitive processes
such as social decision-making. In social daily life situations,
this might for instance translate in to situations wherein these
patients misinterpret, disregard or just incorrectly attribute
(personalizing bias), someone’s emotions during complex social
situations consisting of multiple contextual elements that also
need to be taken into account. This may easily lead to confusion
or inappropriate behavior and conﬂicts. For this reason, the
current results emphasize the need for cognitive remediation
trainings in patients suﬀering from schizophrenia in order to
enhance not only speciﬁc cognitive abilities, but also to improve
the integration of diﬀerent cognitive and aﬀective constructs.
Furthermore, the current study also warrants future research
aimed at investigating the eﬀects of (social) cognitive training
on higher order cognitive processes such as social decision-
making, emotion processing, and emotion regulation processes
which have proven to be eﬀective in regulating healthy persons’
decisions (van’t Wout et al., 2010) and might help these patients
process others’ and own emotions more accurately.
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